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Abstract 
In this paper, it is argued that well-built, social network system has enabled the Mafia to 
reach a certain level of success through three main networks: members, local people, and 
politicians. I assert that the role of the executive power of the state has been partially 
supportive in this success. Moreover, this paper also concludes that to combat different 
Mafia groups, it is essential to know their strong and weak parts. Consequently, it is found 
that their well-built network system does not solely comprise of strong parts but that the 
weak parts also exist, albeit, that they have not yet played a defective role in the resolution of 
the Mafia. Therefore, this paper suggests that the illustration of both the strong and weak 
parts of these networks can have prominent and assisting role in the combat against the 
Mafia phenomenon in the future, either by strengthening the weak parts or by weakening the 
strong parts of its networks. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The mafia phenomenon in Italy has been discussed widely from sociological, economical, 
psychological, etymological and political point of view whereas the social network system of 
the mafia from the approach of closed networks has not taken its place in the literature. 
Therefore, this paper aims to focus on the social network system of the different Mafia 
associations so as to fill the gap in the mafia studies. I need to mention the name of the 
prosecutor, Giovanni Falcone, who was murdered in 1992 by Sicilian Mafia (Cosa Nostra) as 
the source of inspiration of this paper through his words about the Mafia:1 "We have to learn 
to think about the methods of Cosa Nostra calmly and with an open mind."2 Hopefully, this 
paper tries to show a distinctive analysis on how different Mafia groups have built their 
methods through up-to-date networks, reaching a certain level of success. The main aim of 
this paper is not to show how to combat the Mafia by using its networks but to examine how 
they built their networks and illustrating the strong and weak parts of these networks in order 
to assist the fight against the Mafia.  
 
In the first section, the paper emphasizes the theoretical and methodological reasoning of the 
paper. The paper highlights the social networks application to organized crimes, and finally, it 
explains the differential organizations theory of Matsueda3 which is used for this analytical 
and critical paper, before taking a further step and commencing the network analysis of the 
organized crimes in Italy.  
 
In the second part, the notion is regarded firstly with the members of the Italian Mafia 
associations. This is necessary to comprehend what kind of formation they have, how they 
gain new members and build a system of recruitment, the importance of leadership, and their 
communicative and descriptive type of relationship. Moreover, pentito (Mafioso who are 
collaborated with justice) is explained as a concept of the weak part of these networks. To 
illustrate the argument, open and closed network system of Matsueda4 is used to define their 
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network system after gaining a new member and in altering the type of relationship among the 
members. 
 
In the third section, the main topic will be Italian Mafia groups’ infiltration into the local 
people, how they have dominated the people in the local regions, and subordinated them on 
behalf of their own targets. To make the argument clear, historical link of the Mafia groups in 
rural and urban regions based on the economical, sociological, and cultural facts of these 
regions are presented as the remarkable points.  
 
In the fourth section, Mafia groups’ network with the politicians is the main concern of this 
part. In this section, the corrupted politicians and different Mafia groups’ relationships are 
broadly described. In the next step, my argument suggests that there has never been consistent 
and cooperative commitment among politicians from the ruling and opposition parties in the 
fight against the Mafia. Furthermore, I assert that it is easy to break the relationship between 
the politicians and the Mafia groups. By using Matsueda’s two strong closed networks and a 
weak tie figure5, I define this relationship as weak tie of the two closed strong bonds: the 
Mafia groups and the politicians.  
 
In the fifth and the last part, the executive power of the state is analyzed in the consideration 
of its (dys)functionality and (in)effectiveness in the judicial and administrative divisions of 
the state. This is the last section as it signals that the owner of the relatively big success of the 
Mafia does not simply belong to the efforts of its members while building their networks but 
to the promotional and supportive influence of the half-functional administrative and justice 
system of the Italian state. 
. 
2- Matsueda’s Theory of Social Networks in the Evaluation of Mafia Groups in Italy 
Social networking theory has been the prominent grounding in many fields: social 
psychology, communications, political science, and so on. Apart from these fields, it has 
gained essential importance for the study of organized crimes. Moreover, a network 
perspective can be appraised as a social, political, and economic structure as lasting 
prototypes of the relational bonds between the actors.6 Thus, the denouncing of these bonds 
has critical importance for better comprehension of the workings of organized crimes like the 
Mafia groups in Italy, which have taken their power from social, political, and economical 
discourses.  
It is argued that social networking does not only belong to the upper world but that it is 
exclusively observable in the underworld; in the system of organized crimes.7 In this social 
network of the Mafia, the communication networks have an essential place because social 
interactions are the main instruments of a social organization so communication networks 
constitute the critical elements of social structure of the organization.8 In accordance with 
these communication networks, the argument has gained popularity which states that the 
Mafia’s main network systems are subordinated by three facts: kinship, patronage, and 
friendship.9 Additionally, these relationships, which are huge in number and variety, should 
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be latent; each situation ought to be considered under their particular needs. Therefore, they 
have been master in binding those individuals in a traditional society. Similar to this, "a social 
network was viewed as a field of interaction that had neither units nor boundaries. It was 
formed by ties of friendship, kinship, and acquaintance partly inherited and partly constructed 
by the person himself or herself."10 These kinships, friendships, and networking structures of 
the Mafia phenomenon in Italy will be examined in the next sections within its members, 
local people, and politicians. 
The role of Matsueda’s noteworthy study11 on social organization and crime in this paper 
could not be denied. His work on differential social organizations, collective action and crime 
is significantly important because it illustrates the conceptualization of an organization in 
favor of, and against crime as collective behavior. His figures, which are related with open 
and closed social networks, and local bridges linking two distinct closed networks, have been 
influential on my interpretation of the Mafia’s social networks within its members, local 
people, and politicians, respectively. Two main reasons explain the preference for 
Matseueda’s approach to scrutinize my arguments; first, this is the most appropriate 
orientation for understanding the Mafia’s complex relationship background in Italy because it 
prioritizes goal-focused organizations like the Mafia. Secondly, Matseueda prioritizes 
collective behavior, which is pivotal for the analysis of secretly bonded informal structure like 
the Mafia. Therefore, his theoretical framework sets the tone for this paper. Replication of the 
Matsueda’s figures while analyzing the social networks is the main methodological reasoning 
in the paper. Nonetheless, this paper will hopefully bridge the gap in the academic field of 
Mafia research; where no evaluations exists of the Mafia phenomenon in Italy that takes into 
account its social networks and relations with members, local people, and politicians 
altogether. 
3. Italian Mafia and Its Members 
 
In this part, the regulation of the affairs of the Mafiosi in different Mafia groups and the 
network systems among their members are explored. Firstly, the importance of the concepts, 
which make these bonds stronger, is examined, and further, the meaning of these rules and 
conducts are evaluated from the point of view of different Mafia associations like the Sicilian 
Cosa Nostra (Our Affair), the Napolitan Camorra, and the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta (Society of 
Men of Honor). Secondly, there is a need to clarify the organizational structure of the 
members of the Mafia family so as to comprehend and examine all components of the 
network system among the Mafia members such as the leadership, and the talent of 
adjustability. Thirdly, the vital importance of instrumental friendship, secrecy, and trust are 
the main notions of this section while establishing these networks. Finally, how they increase 
their members and include them in their closed network system and further recruitment 
process are explained by using the open and closed network system of Matsueda12 in Figure 
1. Even though the Mafia associations have been successful in building these networks for its 
members, the existing weak parts among members have been emerging as the pentiti, the 
Mafiosi, who after being captured, turn for confession so collaborate with the justice system 
and violate the code of silence. They are defined as collaboratori di giustizia (collaborators 
with justice). This weak part in their network system is examined in the second section of 
this part, where the importance of their organizational structure, trust, and loyalty are 
elaborated. 
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 Firstly, the bond among mafia members is defined in three basic concepts: conduct, rules, 
and trust. These concepts have a leading role in making close interpersonal relationships and 
have crucial importance for unification in attaining the goals of the Mafia. These 
relationships were labeled as a process for "idealization of Mafia phenomenon."13 This is 
because such an idealization would be indispensible for transferring feelings to the members 
of the Mafia associations in that they belong to an organization with certain types of 
ceremonies and norms. Thereby, these features are established to feel themselves ‘man of 
honor’. In addition to this, these structural rituals create very close formations based on 
strong trustworthiness among the members, which are prominent for the existence of their 
future over the notion of secrecy. Furthermore, trust and close personal relationships are 
fundamental features for the strength of their networks.  
 
The struggle to be a family has significant importance for the different Mafia associations. 
From here, the concept of ‘family’ is the symbol of close relationships, secrecy, and 
trustworthiness as it is expected to be observed in the life of an ordinary family. Moreover, 
although blood kinship is the natural outcome of an ordinary family, this is not always the 
fact for different Mafia groups. For instance, formation of Mafia organizations, especially the 
La Cosa Nostra, resembles a very large family, whose thousands of members is strongly 
bonded and secretly oriented. This is not preferable but demonstrates that having blood 
kinship is not indispensible. On the contrary, the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta does not illustrate 
any hierarchical structure like the La Cosa Nostra but embraces a cell-based approach and the 
importance of blood kinships are more observable.14 Despite the existence of the differential 
structural formations among different Mafia groups, they have corresponding points, such as 
the importance of secrecy, the perception of being a family (with or without blood kinship), 
and demonstrating loyalty.  
 
Secondly, I argue that the organizational structure of the Mafia indicates differences among 
different Mafia groups but the same factor that influences on the contribution of the new 
members has not been changing; this is the protection of the secrecy and building of the trust 
in order to reduce the risks in the closed network system. The formation of the numbers of 
the members, their kinship and territorial basement may vary from one type of Mafia group 
to another. For instance, the traditional Cosa Nostra is a male-dominated family structure 
ruled by a code of conduct for members forbidding them to tell the secrets of their 
organization.15 Moreover, any disobedience may result with violence against the violator of 
these ‘code of conducts.’ Similarly, Sicily’s Cosa Nostra and the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta are 
observed as typical representations of the Mafia, and each is composed of more than 90 clans 
or ‘families.’ Certainly the most powerful are the Cosa Nostra clans, which have some 3,200 
members concentrated in western Sicily.16 The mainland counterpart to the Cosa Nostra is 
the ’Ndrangheta, whose homeland is in the southern Calabrian province of Reggio Calabria. 
Around 4,500 members are grouped into some 90 clans or cosche, "a Sicilian term for 
‘artichoke,’ which is intended to symbolize their intense cohesion."17  
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Finally, while establishing the new closed network system, Mafia members use special 
phrases and choose new members to include in their organizational chart by considering the 
strategic professions of those people from whose expertise they will benefit. In its special 
secrecy, instrumental friendship becomes crucially important while knitting the Mafia’s 
network system to establish its basis as it is vital in order to make their informal organization 
more powerful through enlarging their members with strong bonds and specific 
communication systems. Thus, the expressions ‘Tell him that I sent you’ or ‘Go in my name’ 
are used in the Mafia network as a way of communication.18 These phrases create special 
bonds, which lead to the production of the social networks described in a popular way as ‘the 
friends of the friends.’ (Figure-1) 
 
Furthermore, when the notion is Mafia phenomenon, a distinction should be made between 
different Mafia groups because the Cosa Nostra and ‘Ndrangheta mainly prefer new members 
for recruitment from their neighborhood or towns in southern Italy.19 In contrary, the Camorra 
illustrates different characteristics and can establish its networks outside of their family or 
town if the candidate carries the potential to increase the effectiveness of the organization.20 
Finally the biggest fourth Mafia group from Puglia, Sacra Corona Unita (United Sacred 
Crown), is consisted of three main layers hierarchically but it is important to note that the 
member can graduate its statue in the organization through demonstrating more violence so 
they prove that they may graduate to the up levels. The formations for closed networks and 
connection among the members have crucial importance for the Sacra Corona Unita because 
the networking should be like a ring of a chain.21 Even though, there are differences in the 
formation of the different mafia groups, there is one certain common point which is both 
crucial and indispensible for every mafia groups. This is the creation of trust as a value and its 
importance for the targets of the Mafia. The utmost importance of the trust comes from "an 
emergent property of the social system, as much as a personal attribute. Individuals are able to 
be trusting (and not merely gullible) because of the social norms and networks within which 
their actions are embedded."22 The trust has been established by the symbols and signs in the 
alteration of the Mafia’s network system from open network to closed network in order to add 
new members to their organization. (Figure-1) 
After the deeply descriptive and normative formation of the Mafia members’ network system, 
it is time to illustrate it through the open and closed network system of Matsueda.23 I argue 
that the well-organized communication system of different Mafia groups has a leading role in 
the construction of well-working social networking. Clarity for this argument may be 
enhanced by focusing on the study of Matsueda. He states that "given common everyday 
knowledge of the way in which these structures operate, individuals can use the structures 
strategically, seeking out closed structures to increase control over members."24 He also added 
that in Figure 1a, both A and B can have influence C, but that they can only do it  
independently and with the help of individual sanctions, developing trust, establishing norms, 
and the like. However, they cannot influence each other because of the lack of social ties. As 
in Figure 1b, after this network is established, a close network system is built so that A’, B’, 
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and C’ can influence each other by developing coordinated strategies, simultaneous sanctions, 
and similar rhetorical arguments.25 
For the case of the Mafia system, while they are building their social networks for increasing 
their members and/or to solve the problems of their customers or to make cooperation with 
them, they effectively create a closed social network system through ‘trust’ and the famous 
phrase, ‘tell him that your are friend of mine.’ Thus, after establishing a network followed 
with requirements about efficiency, reliability, and trustworthiness, a new member in the 
Mafia structure can take his place in this closed social network. He is not in the open structure 
anymore, but in the closed structure, where he should now obey the ‘rules’ of the Mafia. 
Additionally, the other significant feature is the importance of stability in the closed groups, 
which is gained through strong ties among its members with similar ideas and homogeneity.26 
Thus, the creation of this strong closed network among its members has crucial magnitude in 
the targets of the Mafia thanks to the principles of solidarity and commitment. Despite 
differences in structuring of the Mafia associations, they all have the same common point 
when trust and secrecy are the notions. 
  A’   Established network     B’ 
 A B                                              
                                                                              
    
          Trust 
 ‘Friends of friends’ 
       
                         C                                                                                             C’ 
 
a. Open structure                                                                      b. Closed structure 
 
Figure 1 – Replication of open and closed social networks. (Source: Ross L. Matsueda, 
"Differential Social Organization, Collective Action and Crime," Crime, Law, and Social 
Change, 46 (2006), 14. 
 
At this point, after examining the strong parts of the Mafia while recruiting new membership, 
it remains important to stress the weak part of this network. Traditionally, secrecy is 
perceived as the most important criteria in order to be member of the mafia groups and to 
keep secrets after contribution to the Mafia as well. Contrary to this strict rule, it had been 
observed many times that the Mafiosi collaborated with the police when they were captured. 
Therefore, they violated these rules by becoming pentiti and confiding their secrets to the 
police and justice organs. Even the leaders of Mafia, through being pentiti, violated these 
rules. Accordingly, such violations are a natural outcome of being captured. This is because 
many Mafiosi primarily prefer to consider their own future and benefits by becoming pentiti 
and have some privileges through their sentence and conditions as the fruitful result of 
cooperating with the justice system and confessing Mafia secrets. Thereby, the pentiti 
emerges as a significant concept of the weak part of different Mafia groups in Italy and the 
strong part in their closed network system sustains its strength until being captured of the 
Mafiosi who starts facing the challenges at the same time. 
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The first pentito in 1973, Leonardo Vitale confessed significant secrets; albeit he did not 
receive sufficient attention for his confessions because of his mental problems. Apart from 
him, the most significant Mafioso turned pentito was Tommasso Buscetta in the 1980s. He 
helped prosecutor Giovanni Falcone in the identification of the main channels that the Mafia 
operated. Especially, after the Maxi Trial process during the mid 1980s, important Mafioso 
figures decided to be pentiti, such as Salvatore Contorno, Antinino Calderone, Giovanni 
Brusca, and so on.27 In addition to this, it has rarely been observed that such collaboration has 
been done with willingness when there is no possibility for arrest. Therefore, the consistency, 
solidarity, and loyalty to the Mafia are widely followed until being captured. In sum, the 
success of the Mafia groups has been limited because of the pentiti factor. Besides, the 
Mafiosi prefer to collaborate with the state after they are captured. This weak part, confession 
of the Mafiosi, has played as an essential role many times to resolve the networks of the 
different Mafia groups. 
4. Italian Mafia and Local People 
 
This section aims to show the well-established communication networks of different Mafia 
groups, who take their territorial power from the relationships between the Mafiosi and the 
local people. Throughout the section, territorial power of the different Mafia groups is 
examined, which is a significant instrument to improve their strength over the local people. 
Firstly, Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning will be applied to examine the bond between 
the Mafia groups and local people. Secondly, I will argue that the weak parts of these 
networks have been again the local people, who have tried to show resistance against the 
Mafia by protesting the Mafia individually or establishing civil associations against its 
culture.  
 
In this section, the main concern is adaptation of Kohlberg’s28 and Piaget’s notions over 
stages of moral reasoning,29 which were referred in the study of Matsueda as well.30 This 
adaptation is focused on the relationships between the Mafia and local people on the one 
hand, and local people’s reactions to these relationship bonds, on the other. Firstly, there is a 
need to elaborate Kohlberg’s three levels and six stages of moral reasoning31 before making 
such a deep assessment. These six stages are based on the relationships between the parents 
and children through following stages by role taking and the application of it to moral 
reasoning, and later a provoking question follows it that is to be directed to the children. The 
reason I replicated the relationship between the child and parents to the relationship between 
Mafia and local people can be explained by the similarity of those actors. The emergence of 
the Mafia from the late 19th century among the local people, its changing situation over time 
and representing an authoritative and repressive figure in the contemporary era may share the 
attitudes of the parents who raise a child and demonstrate violence to their child in time with 
an irresponsible attitude. 
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Table 1 Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning 
Levels                                                      Stages 
Level 1 Pre-Conventional Morality       Stage 1. Obedience and punishment orientation 
Stage 2. Individualism, exchange, and 
instrumentalism 
Level 2 Conventional Morality             Stage 3. Good relationships and mutual expectations 
         Stage 4. Law and order 
Level 3 Post-Conventional Morality     Stage 5. Social contract and individual rights 
         Stage 6. Universal ethical principles 
(Source: Ross L. Matsueda, "Differential Social Organization, Collective Action, and Crime," 
Crime, Law, and Social Change, 46 (2006), 11. 
 
In the application of these principles, I examine the relationship between the local people and 
the historical Mafia, which exists in the towns of southern Italy and also in urban life in the era 
of the contemporary Mafia in the last decades. I argue that since the middle of the 19th century, 
stage 1, stage 2, and stage 3 occurred and that stage 4 had occurred partially because the 
representative of the ‘law and order’ was not extensively identical with the Mafia but did start 
being under state control, particularly after the Maxi-trial in 1986. Additionally, this stage has 
not been completed because of the existence of untrustworthiness in the region, and less likely, 
because of the behavior of the local people to cooperate with the justice system, even though 
this number has increased in the last decades. I assert that the Mafia phenomenon in Italy can 
widely be eradicated from the country after the end of stage 4, where all local people in the 
southern region and all the people in the country admit the supreme power of culture of 
lawfulness and legality and have the sufficient encouragement to stand against the Mafia. Post-
conventional morality is the last level in Italian society that ought to be reached, as it is a level 
of morality to rid the severe grip of the Mafia. Stages 5 and 6 in this last level may provide an 
ideal country, where the Mafia notion cannot invade the social, political, and economical 
arenas anymore by subordination of the local people physically, psychologically, and 
sociologically.  
 
Additionally, to comprehend such a relationship between the local people and the Mafia 
groups deeply, I explain step-by-step how I raise these arguments through following three 
levels and six stages of Kohlberg’s moral reasoning. The first stage – obedience and 
punishment – occurred since emergence of the Mafia phenomenon in the middle of the 18th 
century and was observed extensively until the period of the contemporary Mafia which has 
been effective in the last decades. Obeying the rules and not to be punished by the Mafiosi 
have been violated frequently in the last decade, but the fear of punishment by the Mafiosi is 
still effective in both rural areas and cities of Mezzogiorno – southern Italy. The local people 
witnessed brutality and violence publicly and observed clearly what happened to the ones who 
did not take the threats and notices of the Mafia groups seriously. These people paid for this 
opposition with their lives. Undoubtedly, an unequal relationship clearly exists between the 
local people and the Mafiosi like the one that exists between a child and its authoritative 
parents. The Mafioso was the supreme authority over the local people so only one option 
remained for the local people and this was obeying the rules and power of the Mafiosi.  
 
The second stage – individualism and exchange – was accordingly the outcome of such 
oppression. Security has been one of the crucial elements in taking care of the benefits of the 
community and society. With a lack of security and in the place of violence where your life is 
in danger, consideration of the societal benefits is not expected in the long term, so from an 
egocentric perspective, the security of your life becomes more significant in the first instance. 
This is also the reason why the Mafia has become more powerful through the features of this 
network structure and that people valued it to ask for ‘private protection.’32 Due to these 
reasons, the local people preferred to obey ‘omertà’ –code of silence- when any issue was 
related to the Mafia. These first two stages would be labeled as pre-conventional morality 
reasoning, which emerged in the atmosphere of violence, embezzlement, and oppression, so 
egocentrism and personal benefits became the priority for the local people to survive under 
such a brutality. 
 
The second level – conventional morality – has not been terminated completely yet. Although 
the third stage – good relationships and mutual expectation – has come to an end, the fourth 
stage – law and order – is still in the process of completion. If I start from the third stage, this 
process has almost been completed in the demonstration of people’s attempts to consider the 
benefits of the society as a whole through organizing civil societies and non-governmental 
initiatives against the Mafia phenomenon. Aside from the anti-Mafia movement, local people 
have showed their cooperation by being pentiti and breaking the order of silence about the 
Mafia. In this regard, the local people who made such cooperation labeled their act as ‘Good’ 
and the Mafia as ‘Bad’. Thus, they started improving ‘good relationships’ with the justice, 
police, and administrative organs of the state. On the other hand, this optimistic panorama can 
be deceptive because the local people should take the most crucial step, the fourth step, in the 
fight against the Mafia. The supreme power of rule of law and the benefits of the society, 
which are based on legality, should be the main basement in the fight against the Mafia. 
Unfortunately, such a decisive struggle has not already been observed by the contribution of 
the all people in the region. For instance, in Sicily, the majority of the people and local shops 
still pay pizzo, a protection racket.33 In sum, the completion of the fourth stage and establishing 
the pure mechanism of law and order in the region is significantly prominent to terminate the 
second level – conventional morality. The devastating past history in the story of the local 
people and the relationships with the Mafia should not be underestimated for the completion of 
the third step permanently and after the victory of the fourth stage, the last level is likely to be 
less challenging. 
 
The last level – post-conventional morality – can only occur in the last steps of the fight if it 
becomes possible to eradicate the Mafia from the country completely one day. The fifth step – 
social contract and individual rights – may increase its importance on Italian citizens in an 
environment where they can enforce the political spectrum with mass social movements to ask 
for decisive and ad hoc policies, only associated with the social contract, whose particular 
characteristic recognizes the benefits of both individuals and society through anti-corruption, 
transparency, accountability, and matured democracy. Therefore, in the last step, it can be 
possible to talk about the universal values and ethics after taking account of the full consensus 
of the citizens’ participation in this process. In the last place, after a significant victory has 
been gained against the Mafia groups, the remaining Mafiosi can start giving up and breaking 
off their illegal and violent business and brutality so they may potentially turn towards these 
universal values and ethics. This argument has already found its echoes in the definition of 
social equilibrium of Putnam. The high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic 
engagement and collective well-being are noted as the traits to define civic community.34 In 
this regard, attaining the last level depends on the establishment of these traits so as to be a 
recognized civic community who demonstrate consistent resistance against the Mafia. 
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 Finally, a weak part also exists in the networks of the Mafiosi within the local people. 
Although this weak part has not been directly related to the success or failure of the Mafiosi, it 
has an indirect effect, which causes direct resistance from the local people to increase their 
voice against the subordination of the Mafia. It still remains difficult to declare that this weak 
part is strong enough to break all these networks of the different Mafia groups among the local 
people in today’s Italy. But it contains in itself an opportunity for the future to demolish its 
networks when the resistance of the local people is extended and becomes powerful enough to 
replace the culture of illegality with the culture of lawfulness.  
 
The first strikes of this resistance were appeared generally as individual reactions. For 
instance, Italian journalist Mauro de Mauro was kidnapped by the Mafia in 1970 when he tried 
to investigate a murder.35 Secondly, in 1978 the Cosa Nosta murdered Giuseppe Impastato, a 
significant anti-Mafia figure and political activist. He was born in a Mafia family but decided 
to fight against the Cosa Nostra and paid it with his life. This was the striking point to prove 
that the Mafia brutally reacts when their networks and ‘respectability’ are targeted. Mauro de 
Mauro and Giuseppe Impastato were not the only victims of this resistance. Libero Grassi was 
a businessman who rejected to pay pizzo, extortion money, and he advertised in the newspaper 
by calling other businessmen not to pay racket to the Mafia. He was murdered in 1991.36 
Furthermore, the tragic assassinations of the prosecutors Giovanne Falcone and Paolo 
Borsellino in 1992 had been the limit for the civil society to illustrate their reaction in a well 
planned and intensive way. All these individual attempts to seek the Mafia’s dirty works and to 
fight against it lead to attaining societal reactions against the Mafia. Thereby, Libera was 
established in 1995 as a non-profit civil society aimed at fighting against the Mafia and giving 
self-esteem and support to the local people who show their resistance to it. This resistance has 
been institutionalized with over 1000 associations in the country but it is still far from 
declaring that victory has been accomplished in this fight. Apart from Libera, many other civil 
society organizations were established to be aligned in the fight against the Mafia. What is 
more, this struggle should not be underestimated because of its potential opportunity in 
devastating the local networks of the Mafiosi. For instance, in 2009, over 100,000 people 
gathered in Naples and marched against the Mafia.37 Even though the domination of the 
different Mafia groups is still clearly observable in southern Italy, these popular protests are 
the weak part of the networks of the Mafiosi on local people who demonstrated clear 
reluctance  to react against the Mafia for dozens of years. 
 
Therefore, the success of the Mafia on the influence of the local people depends on many 
reasons, such as the socio-historical situation of the region, cultural patriarchy, economic 
factors, the lack of the existence of a responsible state mind in the region, and a combination of 
all these paradigms. All these reasons need to be counted in this complex sociological 
concentration of the Mafia. Further, if we do not consider their well-calculated social network 
system and influence on the local people through these networks, any explanation is far from 
being complete. Indeed, I assert that the power of this network comes from the strong bond 
between the local people and authoritative manner of the Mafiosi. This also makes challenging 
to devastate the Mafia and prevent its extended power and pressure on the local people but the 
very recently civil society attempts and sensitivity with the aim of eradication the Mafia cause 
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to protect the hope for the future and becomes the weak part of the Mafia’s networks within 
the local people. 
 
5. Italian Mafia and Politicians 
 
In this section, I argue that the relationship between the Mafiosi and the politicians is based 
on mutual benefits of the each part. The polls are given as an example to indicate intersected 
parts where the Mafiosi and politicians correspond. Secondly, I conclude that the contextual 
events are influential in the evaluation of the collusion between the politicians and the Mafia 
from the perspective of decaying corrupted institutions. Finally, I assert that sensitive bond 
between the politicians and the Mafia is the main concern of this part. The main argument 
concentrates on the sensitivity of this bond as the outcome of existing weak link between the 
politicians and Mafiosi, which is open to be broken up easily due to the lack of emotional 
attachment. I will illustrate my argument with Figure 2 through Matseuda’s weak tie of two 
strong closed networks. This deficiency of the emotional bond has also been the weak part of 
their successfully renowned history and mutual benefits, which is hard to discover but easy to 
be broken up after its emergence. 
 
I argue that the symbiotic relationship between the Mafiosi and politicians dominates their 
networks, taking into account the benefits of both parts. In this context, the commencement 
of this strong relationship between the Mafia and politicians should be perceived as a 
historical phenomenon whose roots were established on the symbiotic bond of each part in 
the reality of the criminal world because of its target for higher goal and profit making.38 
This bond managed to extend to the entire political system, especially after the emergence of 
the Mafia in the 19th century. In the meantime, this poison seems to have had an aphrodisiac-
like effect in the spectrum of the cooperative Mafia-political nexus. Moreover, the pure 
dependency of the politicians on the territorial power of the Mafia was more apparent during 
election times because winning a local or parliamentary election is almost unachievable 
without accepting Mafia protection.39 Thereof, the Mafia had another arm in the Senate and 
Chamber of the Duties to use for their ends, which were mostly related with the political and 
administrative handicaps that they faced.40 Thus, this system, which is consisted of real 
power groups, may have the potential to affect political life deeply by using its influence on 
people’s decisions during the electoral time.41 In sum, then, the baseline of these mutual 
relationships was determined by the obsessive power holders between the Mafiosi and 
politicians. The polls also can give clues about rising power of the Mafia and it becomes 
clear after the emergence of questionable rising situation of Silvia Berlusconi in the political 
arena in the first half of the 1990s. That was interpreted as a ‘vicious circle’: "More than a 
few corrupt Christian Democrats and Socialists who were voted out in the anti-Mafia climate 
of the 1990s are now finding their way back into office – most of them as candidates for the 
right-wing conservative camp of Silvio Berlusconi’s governing coalition."42 In the last 
elections, by presenting the unified list under the slogan of Casa della Libertà (‘House of 
Liberty’) more essentially, they gained extensive success by winning 60 direct seats.43  
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Political institutions, contextual events and even international setting may help to throw a 
light on the notion to examine the relationship between the politicians and the Mafiosi. For 
instance, Propaganda Due (P2) was a secret Masonic lodge whose members are comprised 
not only journalists and people from the business and industry but also from the Italian 
Parliament like Silvio Berlusconi, current prime minister of the country.44 P2 influenced 
taking over Corriere della Sera, prominent Italian newspaper,45 misleading police in the 
investigation of Bologna Massacre which happened in 1980 and resulted with death of 85 
people.46 Secondly, Gladio, stay-behind secret organization, was influential in Italy in order 
to create resistance against communism with the collaboration of the CIA and other Mafia 
associations in Italy. The collusion of the Gladio with the politicians and the underworld 
were mainly structured both the political spectrum after post-war Italy and remained as 
another justification for mafia-politicians collusion.47 Thirdly, Aldo Moro, Prime Minister of 
Italy was killed in 1978 by a communist organization, Red Brigades, and it is argued that he 
was not saved by Italian government because of the fear that Moro could confess about 
Gladio.48 Moreover, one of the most significant examples was the operation of ‘Clean 
Hands’. During this operation, 3,200 suspected bureaucrats and politicians were convicted 
between 1992 and 2002.49 Unfortunately, even before these corruptions, mafia domination in 
the politics was expressed and approved by the state founded organizations like Ant-Mafia 
Commission which was established in 1962.50 Thus, it is clear that other secret organization 
accompanied the Mafia in the second half of the 20th century after the manipulation of the 
Italian social and political life widely by the Mafia during the first half of the 20th century. It 
is remarkable to stress that the state demonstrated counter attack to the Mafia and secret 
organizations. In this regars, Maxiprocesso, Maxi Trial, was held between 1984 and 1986. As 
a result, hundredths of the Mafiosi put behind the bars. Resolution of the secret organization 
like P2 and Gladio; and the operations of Clean Hands occurred during the 1990s. In the last 
years, famous Mafia Godfathers like Bernardo Provenzano and Salvotore Russo were 
captured. All these developments against the Mafia in the country created the image that the 
fight against the Mafia has gradually been more successful recently. But, the last confession 
of the son of former mayor of Palermo, Massimo Ciancimino caused the public to be in 
doubt about anti-mafia struggle of Berlusconi government. He declared that Forza Italia, led 
by Berlusconi, was the result of negotiations between the state and Cosa Nostra, Sicilian 
Mafia.51  
 
Therefore, in order to make these complex networks more observable systematically, there is 
a need to elaborate and illustrate the network relations between politicians and the Mafia on a 
figure. According to Matsueda, as it is shown in Figure 2, closed network groups can 
establish weak ties with other closed groups to have benefits from information flows, novel 
ideas, more so, since all these exchanges are coming from a set of comparatively dissimilar 
groups.52 In addition to this, the weak ties between different closed networks provide group 
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members chances to increase the likelihood of group members who organize into social 
movements.53 For the case of the Mafia, the weak tie between C and E in Figure 2 represents 
the mutual outcomes of this network between the Mafia and politicians and bureaucracy in 
the state. Furthermore, it is argued that resource mobilization theory through the utilization of 
the maximum benefits of the rational actors by using their social networks and political 
opportunities is significant with collective action.54 It remains important to stress that in order 
to design such collective action, the civic engagement less likely to be observed with the lack 
of trust to the politicians.55 With hindsight it is clear that this is the road taken by the political 
institutions and regional governments in order to make cooperation with the Mafia.  
  
Besides, the significance of the accordance for the objectives and the struggle to employ 
them to make their targets attainable has become the remarkable argument for the criminal 
world.56 This argument is also operative for the case of the Mafia. On the one hand, the 
Mafia worked for the politicians to help them in the struggle to take the power in the 
elections, or to make their positions stronger and to support the bureaucrats through bribes 
financially. On the other hand, its position and businesses became more and more secure 
under the protective umbrella of the state bureaucrats and politicians. This mutual network 
structure between the Mafia and dark side of the state is one of the essential proofs as to why 
the success of the vicious cycle of the Mafia could not be terminated permanently to date. 
Their meeting point to serve their mutual benefits makes this bond stronger but not 
unbreakable. Furthermore, this bond is weak when we compare two groups’ network 
structures, which are based on rules, laws, and regulations for both the informal organization 
of the Mafia and the formal organization of the state. Therefore, since this bond between C 
and E (see Figure 2) is based on mutual material benefits but not strong emotional bonds, this 
tie can be defined as paradoxically weak but strong in terms of resisting showing their 
relationships explicitly. Moreover, the indispensable relationship between the Mafia and 
politicians is open to some risk of being broken up when their benefits are at risk. Therefore, 
in this regard, this tie is also weak but breaking it up is difficult since this symbiotic 
relationship of the two closed group networks has a very little strategic gap that can harm 
their bonds. 
 
Mafia’s closed network system                                 Politicians’ and bureaucracy’s closed network system 
 D H 
 
               
 
                          Mutual Benefits  
 A C  Bribe &electoral support  E                                   G 
    
                                                         Political & Legal Protection 
 
          
               Local Bridge (Weak tie)  
                                           B                    Between C and E        F 
              Group 1   Strongly tied                                                             Group 2 Strongly tied 
 
                                                           
53
 Mark Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," American Journal of Sociology 78(May 1973): 1360-1380 
54
 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and 
Assessment," Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000), 611-639. 
55
 Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 172. 
56
 Edwin H. Sutherland, "Development of the Theory," in E. H. Sutherland, On. Analyzing Crime (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, [1942] (1973), 13-29. 
 
Figure 2 - Replication of the Local Bridge (weak tie) linking two distinct closed networks. 
(Source: Ross L. Matsueda “Differential Social Organization, Collective Action, and Crime.” 
Crime, Law, and Social Change 46:3-33, p. 15, 2006.) 
 
6. Italian Mafia and Executive Power of the State 
 
In this section, the role of the executive power of the state in its relationships with different 
Mafia groups is examined. Throughout the section, I argue that the two most critical 
elements, dysfunctionality and ineffectiveness of the judiciary and administration system of 
the state, fostered the power of the different Mafia groups. Even in the last decade, the 
performance of these institutions has gradually increased, but that it is far from filling the gap 
that has occurred since the birth of the Italian unification in 1861. Firstly, I elaborate on the 
role of the executive power of the state from the concepts of violence and power. Secondly, I 
examine the reliability of the state institutions in the country. Finally, I scrutinize today’s 
political arena in the country and the latest developments in this field.  
 
Firstly, there is a need to make the link as to how Mafia has become successful in the lack of 
state’s observable existence of power and their background knowledge about the facts of the 
society. Further, their success in observing the fact of the state’s illness as not being effective 
in the territorial order made their infrastructure more profitable and serviceable. In the 
meantime, the basement of the Mafia’s emergent point provided them with good knowledge 
of the society’s reaction, formation, and local people’s attitudes.  Thus, the strength of the 
Mafia’s enduring, undefeatable position is related with their strong social networks, which 
were established in the consideration of the historical process and in mastering adaptability 
and power orientation. Using these features, the Mafia gained benefits for their ends through 
cooperating with the politicians and legal authorities in the lines of the mutual outcomes. 
 
Today’s Italian administrative and justice system are in serious decline in terms of its 
efficiency and reliability, which makes the Mafia’s position more durable. The alarming siren 
of the Italian justice system with regard to the decrease in public confidence for the justice 
system creates a dangerous atmosphere in the country.57 In confirmation to this argument, 
"Italian criminal courts seem unable to deal with the backlog of cases. Further, a 2006 pardon 
law intended to put an end to the endemic overcrowding of state prisons, has further 
undermined public confidence in the state’s ability to bring justice to criminal matters."58 In 
fact, urgent reform in the justice and administrative system of Italy is not the issue of recent 
years but one that stems from the historical ineffectiveness of the Italian justice system, 
which has lead to the empowering of the Mafia through the socio-cultural and historical 
structure of the Mezzogiorno (southern Italy) since the mid-19th century. This appropriate 
atmosphere for the Mafia provides them the best conditions to make their bonds stronger and 
to increase their power and ‘order’ over the society.  
 
Thus, although all these statements draw a pessimistic portrait in the fight against Mafia, 
elimination of it from the society and state units is not unattainable. The severe hit to destroy 
the Mafia’s power and capacity should be breaking up its networks, especially the ones 
established with the politicians. In the last years, it has been found that "organized crime is 
negatively related to police performance and the rule of law and positively related to grand 
corruption."59 In this context, if organized crimes are more powerful; legislation, policy-
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making, and legal rulings may not be for the general interests of the public but consider the 
benefits for the few.60 Moreover, the importance of the value network cannot be denied by 
the essential struggle of the police through following goods, knowledge, and the connections 
between actors.61 According to this approach, the cooperation of the legislative officers, 
analysts, and investigating officers may provide crucial support to resolve the organized 
crime networks. Above all, it deserves to emphasis that in order to break up the strong 
networks of the Mafia, what we need is a functional and effective justice system, police 
power, and by creating more operative ways to increase local people’s cooperation with the 
state. The final essential requirement is a public transparency reform to remove grand 
corruption and increase transparency in the public administration and reinforcing the 
executive power of the state with the aim of constituting consolidated anti-mafia policies. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The examination of the Italian Mafia groups from the perspective of social networks, tries to 
fill a significant void in the academia as being the first study by the illustration of the strong 
and weak parts of these networks within three main actors: members, local people, and 
politicians. There is certainly much to be said about the importance of Matsueda’s work 
because his differential social organization sheds light on the strong and weak parts of the 
Mafia. Although the main aim of this paper is not to show how to resolve these networks, 
illustrating these strategic strengths and weaknesses of their networks may play an important 
role in simplifying the methodology of future research regarding the fight against the Mafia 
phenomenon in Italy. 
 
The findings of this paper hopefully fill the gap in the interdisciplinary field of social 
networks and organized crime structuring in Italy. These findings declare that the complex 
structure of the Mafia organization among its members, local people, and politicians has a 
strong historical background that affects the contemporary situation. Making the strong parts 
weaker and using the weaker parts to demolish the strong ones of its networks appear as a 
crucial strategy to be focused on it. Thus, this study’s findings announce firstly the strong 
parts of its networks among the members of the Mafia which are leadership factors; their 
solidarity and commitment until being arrested; the rules, codes, and norms in the 
organizations; adjusting capacity to the new situations by making their organizational 
structure tighter or looser according to this change in closed network structural formation. 
Secondly, the strong part of its networks established with the local people can be summed up 
as the domination of the people through using violence; acting as the informal state in their 
territories; severe punishment of people who violate their rules; creating an untrustworthy 
atmosphere to settle private protection; and reference to the ‘man of honor’ or ‘respectable 
person’ phrases to legitimize their brutal authority. Finally, the politicians who make 
collaboration with the Mafia groups in the exchange of the electoral support and bribery in 
order to get legal and political protection summarize the strong parts of its networks. 
Therefore, another outcome of the relationship has been the enrichment of the each actor’s 
benefit in the system of corruption. 
 
Apart from the strong parts of these networks, the weak parts provide an opening change in 
the ways of how to eradicate these networks. The first weakness in the network is the 
violations of their closed network system even by the leaders of organizations as being pentiti 
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and collaborators with the justice system. Cooperation with justice and state organs and 
violating the basic rules after being arrested emerge as significant outcomes. These results 
bear emphasis that how they are so weak when there is no another alternative to save 
themselves in the existence of pure pressure because they prefer to prioritize their personal 
benefits rather than the benefits of their Mafia family and friends while doing cooperation 
with the state. Secondly, the weak part among the networks of the local people is the 
increasing willingness to resist the dominance of the Mafia groups in the region albeit they are 
still in the minority. In essence, civil society groups, non-governmental institutions and 
personal endeavors may potentially lead a decrease in the extortion of the Mafiosi in the long-
term. Even though this struggle is not directly related with the networks system of the 
Mafiosi, it is the outcome of past violence applications of the Mafiosi on the local people who 
tried before to demonstrate resistance against the Mafiosi and were punished relentlessly. 
Finally, the weak part in the network with politicians is their bond, which is solely based on 
material benefit and the lack of any emotional link between the politicians and the Mafiosi. 
This weak tie between two strong closed network systems is a breaking point when a threat 
appears and putting the benefits of each part in danger. 
 
The second part of the paper focuses on the role of the state and it bears emphasis that the 
state constituted the catalyst in fostering both the emergence and empowering of the Mafia 
because of its malfunction in the administrative and justice system. The decaying trust against 
the politicians has made so difficult the fight to eradicate the Mafia from the political and 
social spectrum of the country. At this point, it is worth noting that lack of such a counter 
poison from the stable state power for demolishing the Italian Mafia has made the humus of 
the Mafia’s culture of illegality more resilient over time. Thereof, if different Mafia 
associations still exist and are invincible in Italy today, albeit in the late efforts of the state, 
their well-built and designed social network system has an essential place in this success story 
of the Mafia, but their achievement cannot solely be explained by the power of their networks. 
Not only the ineffective and corrupted state institutions but also the cooperative roles of some 
politicians with the Mafia and the half functional system in the criminal justice have made the 
position of the Mafia stronger and more overwhelming. Even though there have been 
combative periods to demolish the Mafia, with some fruitful results, these periods could never 
be followed up with corresponding and durable cooperation, including all state institutions 
and politicians to destroy the Mafia permanently. In contrast to this, the Mafia has always 
found another solution to cope with any threat or danger by adjusting themselves to the new 
situations through their disciplined and synchronized structure. Putting it differently, because 
of such a boomerang effect in the fight against the Mafia, the silence of the different Mafia 
groups in the last decade can create butterfly effect for the Mafia groups to increase their 
power and seek new, illegal, and profitable markets with the less risky atmosphere by 
strengthening its weak parts. 
 
All of this amounts to saying that both strong and weak parts of the social networks of the 
Mafia should be followed by a well-designed systematic plan in the contribution of the all 
stakeholders in the society against the Mafia. At this point, it would be reductive not to 
mention about the limitations of this study in order to construct the combat plan with the aim 
of getting rid of the grip of Mafia. Even though, Mafia phenomenon has been studied more 
than one century, the subject contains obstacles because of the criminal secrecy of the 
underworld. In this study, as it commonly occurs in other mafia studies, the limitations are 
firstly based on the confessions of the captured Mafiosi. It is doubtful how much those 
confessions can be trustworthy. Secondly, there may be other strong and weak parts of the 
social networks of the Mafia groups which are not mentioned in this study. Thirdly, this study 
aims to focus on the Mafia networks’ from the point view of actor-based approach rather than 
target-based approach so it classified networks of the Mafia within local people, politicians 
and its members who are significant national actors in terms of emergence of the Mafia and 
gaining power over those networks. Despite these concerns, the limitations of the study 
include opportunities for the Mafia studies in the future as well. Firstly, the opportunity arises 
from taking social networks approach as the point of origin and seeking the targets of the 
Mafiosi throughout those networks. Secondly, this paper is limited with the nation and it does 
not examine the international dimension of the subject so this paper may inspire further 
research endeavors which can take in account the other actors in the field especially 
international social networks of the Mafia and its influence in their past, present and future. 
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